arguments like these 'dialectical', it seems there is hardly anything Carneades could not have said while arguing dialectically. Yet ancient philosophers and modern scholars alike have tended to suppose that there were limits to what Carneades, or indeed any Academic before Philo or Antiochus, could consistently have said about epistemological matters. Very roughly speaking, they have imposed these constraints out of the conviction that the Academics from Arcesilaus to Carneades were sceptics, who arg1,1ed dialectically in order to drive home the sceptical moral that nothing can be known (aKCX'tCXATI'lflCX), of which, unlike the conclusions of their ethical and theological arguments, they were somehow convinced.
Such a view, I believe, lies behind the success enjoyed in recent times by an interpretation of a difficult passage in the Cicero's Academic books. At Lucullus 34 the title character, who speaks for Antiochus, objects to the error, as he sees it, of some Academics who distinguish perspicua, or evident matters (evcxpy~), from percepta, or apprehended matters (KCX'tCXAll7t't1l), and maintain that there is something evident which is true and impressed in the soul and mind and yet cannot be apprehended. This passage follows closely on the heels of another, in which Lucullus attributes a range of views to the Academics, some apparently related to this one, others seemingly very different from it (32-4):
Nor indeed am I able sufficiently to determine what is their intention or what they wish. For sometimes when we put the case to them in this way, 'if the conclusions for which you argue are true, then all things will be nonevident', they reply: 'but what is that to us; is it our fault? blame nature, which has, as Democritus says, hidden truth in the deep'. Others, however, reply in a more refined manner; they even complain because we accuse them of saying all things are nonevident and attempt to show how great a difference there is between the nonevident and that which cannot be apprehended and to distinguish them. Let us deal with these then who distinguish them; those who say that all things are as nonevident as whether the stars are even or odd in number let us abandon as hopeless cases. [ ... ] They are caught in a similar error when, compelled by the reproach of truth, they wish to distinguish evident matters from those that are apprehended ( perspicua a perceptis) and attempt to show that there is something evident, this is true and impressed in the mind and soul, but all the same it cannot be apprehended.
Despite the good reasons to which a minority of dissenters have pointed for supposing that it was Carneades who distinguished
